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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW 
THE LAW OF MEDIA 
“[T]he only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the 
areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an 
enlightened citizenry . . . .  For this reason, it is perhaps here that a 
press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose 
of the First Amendment.” 
New York Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
“Only by uninhibited publication can the flow of information be se-
cured and the people informed concerning men, measures, and the con-
duct of government. . . . Only by freedom of speech, of the press, and of 
association can people build and assert political power, including the 
power to change the men who govern them.” 
Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 
1979 Term—Foreword: Freedom of Expression 
in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980). 
“Our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be 
limited without being lost.” 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Currie (Jan. 28, 1786), 
reprinted in 9 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 239, 239 
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1954) 
“[T]he price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that 
we must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish.” 
United States v. Ballard, 
322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
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courts also might be unwilling to enforce a foreign judgment if the for-
eign court lacked jurisdiction.79  Because U.S. courts are not following 
the trend in the United Kingdom and Australia toward increased ju-
risdiction over foreign media defendants, they may be unwilling in 
many cases to enforce foreign judgments against media defendants. 
Even if U.S. courts fail to enforce the judgments, however, media 
organizations should keep abreast of these foreign developments if they 
have assets abroad.  With other countries increasingly claiming juris-
diction over the media, greater potential for foreign liability makes 
their substantive laws more pertinent. 
VII. NEWSGATHERING IN LIGHT OF HIPAA
The media is society’s watchdog, exposing government corruption 
and disseminating information to which citizens do not readily have 
access.  Recently, media advocates have noted with concern the pas-
sage and implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act1 (HIPAA), which they claim puts the media watchdog 
on too short a leash.2  HIPAA serves as a new source of authority for 
restricting public disclosure of certain medical information — informa-
tion that could form the basis of important news stories about health 
or other topics.  These restrictions are at odds with state freedom of 
information (FOI) laws, which the media has historically used to ob-
tain information about the government’s workings.  This Part exam-
ines the conflict between HIPAA and these state laws as it has 
emerged in state court cases over the last fifteen months.3 
Part A reviews newsgathering, the federal Freedom of Information 
Act4 (FOIA), and state FOI laws.  Part B examines HIPAA and its de-
fined terms.  Part C describes the facts and reasoning of recent cases 
considering the interaction of HIPAA and state FOI laws in Louisiana, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
79 UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(2) (2005). 
1 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 
U.S.C.). 
2 HIPAA has, for example, impeded journalists’ attempts to access patient information from 
hospitals.  See, e.g., Associated Press, New Patient-Privacy Rules Will Hamper Some Newsgather-
ing, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. NEWS, April 14, 2003, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ 
news.aspx?id=11336; Associated Press, Privacy Law Frustrates a Daughter — and Journalists, 
FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. NEWS, Mar. 16, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news. 
aspx?id=16645. 
3 Litigation concerning release of information, even health information, predates HIPAA. 
See, e.g., S. Illinoisan v. Ill. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2006) (requiring the disclosure 
of a cancer registry without any discussion of HIPAA as the initial request for information oc-
curred before the promulgation of the HIPAA regulations).  However, state agencies are now able 
to invoke HIPAA as well as other privacy laws. 
4 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
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Ohio, and Texas.  Finally, Part D offers a framework for the resolution 
of the conflict between HIPAA and state FOI laws. 
A.  Newsgathering, FOIA, and State FOI Laws 
Newsgathering is essential to the production of news.5  However, 
whereas the right to publish information has received significant con-
stitutional protection,6 the right to newsgathering or access has been 
denied similar recognition.7  Even Justice Stewart, although sympa-
thetic to the functions of newsgathering, did not believe that there was 
a “constitutional right to have access to particular government infor-
mation, or to require openness from the bureaucracy.”8  
While the Supreme Court has not granted these rights constitu-
tional status, Congress and state legislatures have provided them in 
statutory form.  In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information 
Act, which enables individuals or the media to obtain information 
from the federal government upon request, subject to nine exemptions. 
Exemptions Three and Six are the most relevant to the application of 
FOIA in the medical privacy context.  Respectively, they allow an 
agency to withhold information when it is “specifically exempted from 
disclosure by statute” or when “personnel and medical files and similar 
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy” are at stake.9 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
5 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“No less impor-
tant to the news dissemination process is the gathering of information.  News must not be unnec-
essarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to publish 
would be impermissibly compromised.  Accordingly, a right to gather news, of some dimensions, 
must exist.”). 
6 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) 
(“Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must 
be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior 
restraints.”). 
7 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“The right to speak and publish does not carry 
with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 
(1974) (“[N]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that 
afforded the general public.”); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First 
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 928 (1992) (“While the press has not always been successful in 
asserting claims for special treatment, . . . the Supreme Court [has been willing] to interpret the 
First Amendment as affording the press a broad range of freedom from restraints on publication. 
Notably, however, . . . the Court has yet to explicitly afford special protections to the newsgather-
ing process.”  (footnotes omitted)). 
8 Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) (citing Pell, 417 U.S. 
817, and Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), both opinions of Justice Stewart). 
9 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (6).  The language of subsection (b)(6) implies a balancing test.  See 
Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976) (“Congress sought to construct an exemp-
tion that would require a balancing of the individual’s right of privacy against the preservation of 
the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act ‘to open agency action to the light of public 
scrutiny.’  The device adopted to achieve that balance was the limited exemption, where privacy 
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All states have adopted freedom of information laws,10 but these 
laws vary considerably.  Most state FOI laws retain a presumption of 
open access, either through statutory language11 or case law,12 whereas 
others contain more ambivalent policy statements recognizing compet-
ing privacy interests.13  Exemptions analogous to those in FOIA con-
stitute perhaps the most concrete way of expressing commitment to 
other legislative priorities, such as privacy, and state laws differ in the 
degree to which these exemptions are discretionary or mandatory.14 
State versions of FOIA’s Exemptions Three and Six diverge in 
ways particularly relevant to state FOI laws’ interactions with HIPAA.  
Exemption Three analogues sometimes create a specific exemption for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ened, for ‘clearly unwarranted’ invasions of personal privacy.”  (quoting Rose v. Dep’t of the Air 
Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1976); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6))). 
 Normally, exemptions under FOIA are discretionary.  However, the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 
U.S.C. § 552a (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), applicable to federal agencies, prohibits the disclosure of 
personal information that is maintained in a “system of records,” defined as a “group of any re-
cords under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the in-
dividual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the 
individual.”  Id. § 552a(a)(5).  Federal courts have strongly suggested that Exemption Six is man-
datory for this type of information.  See U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 964 
F.2d 26, 30 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Cochran v. United States, 770 F.2d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1985).  
Even if the exemption is mandatory, the balancing test in Exemption Six injects some element of 
discretion into the process. 
10 See Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records Statutes, 28 URB. LAW. 
65, 65 (1996). 
11 See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.001 (Vernon 2004) (“[I]t is the policy of this state 
that each person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete 
information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employ-
ees. . . . The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to implement this policy.”). 
Some states put an even greater emphasis on open access, requiring exemptions to be reauthorized 
every five years or expire.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.15 (West Supp. 2006). 
12 See, e.g., State ex rel. Miami Student v. Miami Univ., 680 N.E.2d 956, 958 (Ohio 1997) (“The 
Ohio Public Records Act is intended to be liberally construed ‘to ensure that governmental re-
cords be open and made available to the public . . . subject to only a few very limited and narrow 
exceptions.’” (omission in original) (quoting State ex rel. Williams v. City of Cleveland, 597 
N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ohio 1992))).  See generally Thomas J. Moyer, Interpreting Ohio’s Sunshine 
Laws: A Judicial Perspective, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 247 (2003) (providing an account 
from the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court of courts’ interpretation of the state’s FOI law). 
13 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-1 (Supp. 2005) (“The public’s right to access to public re-
cords and the individual’s right to dignity and privacy are both recognized to be principles of the 
utmost importance in a free society.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 315 (2003) (“It is the policy of this 
subchapter to provide for free and open examination of records . . . .  All people, however, have a 
right to privacy . . . which ought to be protected unless specific information is needed to review 
the action of a governmental officer.”). 
14 Most states follow FOIA and make exemptions discretionary.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 22.7 (West Supp. 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-712.05 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).  However,
others include mandatory exemptions as well.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §§ 10-
615, 10-618 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-203 (Supp. 2006).  Separate 
state privacy laws may also make discretionary exemptions in the state FOI law mandatory, just 
as the Privacy Act of 1974 does for FOIA’s Exemption Six. 
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other laws, as in the Ohio Public Records Act,15 or they may place the 
exemption in the provision dealing with the right to examine records, 
as in the Louisiana Public Records Law.16  In an effort to consolidate 
information, California compiles within the statute itself all state laws 
that provide an exemption to California’s FOI law.17  
Analogues to Exemption Six occasionally mimic FOIA’s language 
nearly exactly,18 preserving the balancing test implicit in it.  However, 
some states have broadened the language to cover “information”19 
rather than “files,” required only an “invasion of privacy”20 rather than 
the more subjective “clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy” for the 
exemption to apply, or stated that a public interest must be demon-
strated by “clear and convincing evidence” before an invasion of pri-
vacy would be warranted.21  The Ohio Public Records Act contains an 
exemption simply for medical records,22 thus effectively eliminating a 
balancing test and replacing it with a determination of whether some-
thing qualifies under the definition of a medical record.  The Louisiana 
Exemption Six analogue is derived from a confidentiality law identi-
fied in the Exemption Three analogue,23 while Texas has created a 
separate confidentiality exemption that covers “information considered 
to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial 
decision.”24  Finally, Utah has integrated protected health information 
as defined by HIPAA into its FOI law exemptions directly,25 eliminat-
ing the need to consider the conflict between the two statutes. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (West 2002).  The Exemption Three analogue exempts 
“[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.”  Id. § 149.43(A)(1)(v). 
16 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:31 (Supp. 2006). 
17 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6276.02–.48 (Deering 2002 & Supp. 2006). 
18 See, e.g., id. § 6254(c). 
19 See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/140-7(b) (West Supp. 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 15.243(a) (West 2004). 
20 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10,002(d)(1) (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72(2) 
(West Supp. 2002). 
21 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 192.502(2) (2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29B-1-4(2) (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2006). 
22 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(1)(a) (West 2002).  Medical records are defined as “any 
document or combination of documents, except births, deaths, and the fact of admission to or dis-
charge from a hospital, that pertains to the medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical con-
dition of a patient and that is generated and maintained in the process of medical treatment.”  Id. 
§ 149.43(A)(3). 
23 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:4.1(B)(5) (Supp. 2006) (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13:3734 (2006)).
24 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.101 (Vernon 2004). 
25 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-107 (2004). 
2007] DEVELOPMENTS — MEDIA 1059 
B.  Medical Privacy and HIPAA 
In 1996, Congress enacted HIPAA, which, among other things, set 
standards for disclosure of health information.26  Although many states 
have general or medical privacy laws, HIPAA was intended to pre-
empt them to the extent that it is more stringent.27  HIPAA was con-
ceptualized as setting a floor of medical privacy protection for Ameri-
can citizens to replace the patchwork protections that states and 
healthcare providers had provided in the past.28 
Determining whether information is covered by HIPAA is a multi-
step process.  For information to be protected it must be “individually 
identifiable.”29  The entity that controls the information must also be 
considered a “covered entity.”30  HIPAA allows covered entities to dis-
close protected health information without the written authorization of 
an individual if the “use or disclosure is required by law and the use or 
disclosure complies with and is limited to the relevant requirements of 
such law.”31 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
26 The HIPAA statute itself was somewhat vague in establishing disclosure standards, but in 
2001 the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued detailed regulations interpret-
ing the statute, which took effect for most covered entities on April 14, 2003.  See 45 C.F.R. 
§§ 160, 164 (2005). 
27 Id. § 160.203. 
28 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 
82,464 (Dec. 28, 2000).  For commentary on HIPAA’s effects, see Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. 
Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy and Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the Na-
tional Health Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439 (2002), and Peter D. Jacobson, 
Medical Records and HIPAA: Is It Too Late To Protect Privacy?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1497 (2002).  
There has been little scholarly commentary about the interaction of HIPAA and the First 
Amendment.  For an exception, see David R. Morantz, Comment, HIPAA’s Headaches: A Call for 
a First Amendment Exception to the Newly Enacted Health Care Privacy Rules, 53 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 479 (2005). 
29 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.  The relevant regulation provides: 
Individually identifiable health information is information that is a subset of health 
information, including demographic information collected from an individual, and: 
 (1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health 
care clearinghouse; and 
 (2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of 
an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or fu-
ture payment for the provision of health care to an individual; and 
(i) That identifies the individual; or 
(ii) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can 
be used to identify the individual. 
Id. 
30 Id.  “Covered entity” is defined as: 
 (1) A health plan. 
 (2) A health care clearinghouse. 
 (3) A health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form 
in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter. 
Id.  As the definition demonstrates, not all state or federal agencies are covered entities under 
HIPAA. 
31 Id. § 164.512(a).   
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C.  Recent Cases 
Three state courts have recently resolved controversies surrounding 
state FOI laws and HIPAA.  These cases all involved journalists who 
requested information using FOI laws but were rebuffed by the gov-
ernment agencies that controlled the information.  These agencies 
stated that the information was protected either by HIPAA or by ex-
emptions within the state FOI law.  The courts diverged in their opin-
ions on disclosure, but this divergence may be explained in part by the 
courts’ consideration of separate information requests under different 
state statutory schemes. 
1. Louisiana. — In Hill v. East Baton Rouge Parish Department of
Emergency Medical Services,32 the First Circuit Court of Appeal of 
Louisiana ruled that 911 tapes controlled by the Louisiana Department 
of Emergency Medical Services were exempted from public inspection 
by provisions of both HIPAA and the Louisiana Public Records Law.33  
On February 21, 2005, Gannett newspaper correspondent John Hill 
requested 911 tapes of the call made on behalf of Louisiana Secretary 
of State Fox McKeithen, who had been transported from his home to 
the hospital.34  The trial court, reviewing the tapes in camera, con-
cluded that they contained protected health care information as de-
fined by HIPAA and thus were not disclosable.35 
Affirming, the Court of Appeals analyzed the issues under both the 
Louisiana Public Records Law and HIPAA, holding that the 911 call 
was not disclosable under either statutory scheme.36  The court high-
lighted an Exemption Three analogue in the state FOI law that re-
quired disclosure “[e]xcept . . . as otherwise specifically provided by 
law.”37  The majority then noted that a law protecting the confidential-
ity of privileged communications between a health care provider and 
patient applied to the 911 call, preventing disclosure.38  Turning to 
HIPAA, the court found that the relevant division of the Department 
of Emergency Medical Services met the definition of a health care 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
32 925 So. 2d 17 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
33 Id. at 23.  The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied certiorari.  Hill v. E. Baton Rouge Par-
ish Dep’t of Emergency Med. Servs., 927 So. 2d 311 (La. 2006) (mem.).  Some states have explic-
itly protected 911 calls from disclosure.  See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-21.1-17 (1997). 
34 Hill, 925 So. 2d at 19. 
35 Id. at 19–20. 
36 Id  at 22. 
37 Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted) (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:31(B) (Supp. 2006)) .  
38 Id. at 19–20 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734 (2006)).  Since the confidentiality law 
points to the Louisiana Evidence Code for definitions of when such privileges apply, the court 
also consulted the Code to arrive at its judgment.  Id. (citing LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 510(B) 
(2006)).  
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provider and thus was a covered entity under HIPAA.39  The 911 calls 
received by the division contained health information protected under 
HIPAA, so tapes of the calls were also not disclosable under federal 
law.40 
Judge Guidry dissented, arguing that the relationship between a 
911 caller and an operator did not rise to the level of a confidential 
communication and that the calls only served the purpose of arranging 
for transportation to a hospital.41  He then stressed the fundamental 
right of freedom of access to public records contained in both the  
Louisiana Constitution and the Public Records Law.42  Further, he 
opined that HIPAA was inapplicable because the division that took 
the call did not fit the definition of a covered entity under the HIPAA 
regulations.43 
2.  Ohio. — In State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels,44 the 
Supreme Court of Ohio held that the state’s Public Records Act re-
quired disclosure of notices and assessment reports regarding lead con-
tamination maintained by the Cincinnati Health Department.45  On 
January 16, 2004, Cincinnati Enquirer reporter Sharon Coolidge re-
quested lead citation reports, issued between 1994 and 2004, that indi-
cated that children living at certain residences had elevated levels of 
lead in their blood.46  According to the Health Department, providing 
the unredacted reports would make it too easy to discover the identi-
ties of the children whose health information the reports contained.47  
The Hamilton County Court of Appeals upheld the agency’s decision 
not to disclose.48 
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and granted a writ of manda-
mus.  It analyzed the potential conflict between the state FOI law and 
HIPAA.  First, the court reviewed the relevant records to determine 
whether they contained health information protected under HIPAA.49  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 Id. at 22–23.  This finding was supported by the fact that the respondents at the division 
were, at the very least, required to have EMT training and were trained to dispense medical ad-
vice if necessary.  Id. at 22. 
 40 Id. at 23. 
 41 Id. at 24 (Guidry, J., dissenting). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 25. 
 44 844 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 2006). 
 45 See id. at 1184. 
 46 Id. at 1183–84.  The Department of Health obtained this medical information about blood 
lead levels through its administration of blood tests to children in the state.  See Brief of Respon-
dents-Appellees Judith Daniels & the City of Cincinnati Health Dep’t at 1, Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 
1181 (No. 05-0068), 2005 WL 2402040. 
 47 See Daniels, 844 N.E.2d at 1184.  The Health Department released 170 unredacted lead 
citations for multiple-family residences, but it still refused to provide unredacted copies of 173 
other reports from single-family residential properties.  Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 1185–86. 
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Because the only sentence in the reports the court found relevant to its 
inquiry — “[t]his unit has been reported to our department as the resi-
dence of a child whose blood test indicates an elevated lead level” — 
was a mere “nondescript reference,” the court concluded that HIPAA 
did not protect the records.50 
The court proceeded to consider whether HIPAA would preempt 
the state FOI law if HIPAA did protect the health information con-
tained in the reports.  It noted that the regulations interpreting HIPAA 
contained “a ‘required by law’ exception” and that the Ohio Public 
Records Act contained an exemption for disclosure that is prohibited 
by federal law, creating a problem of “circular reference.”51  Consulting 
the Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary’s commentary ac-
companying HIPAA, the court determined that the Secretary did not 
intend for HIPAA to override all state and federal laws requiring dis-
closure, including FOIA.52  Drawing an analogy to FOIA, which the 
Secretary indicated came within HIPAA’s “required by law” exception, 
the court concluded that the Ohio Public Records Act was not pre-
empted by HIPAA.53  Thus, disclosure was required.54 
3.  Texas. — In Abbott v. Texas Department of Mental Health & 
Mental Retardation,55 the Third District Court of Appeals of Texas 
held that statistical information does not constitute protected health 
information under HIPAA, and even if it did, this information is dis-
closable under Texas’s FOI law.56  In this case, a reporter made a re-
quest to the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retarda-
tion for “statistical information regarding allegations of abuse and 
subsequent investigations of abuse in state facilities” as well as the 
names of said facilities.57  The Department, concerned that HIPAA 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 Id. at 1185.  The court likely arrived at the wrong conclusion as to whether at least some of 
the reports contained information that was not sufficiently de-identified.  A covered entity would 
have a “reasonable basis to believe” that the presence of an address for a single-family home could 
identify the person from whom the information came, at least for the more recent records, and 
thus the information would qualify as “individually identifiable health information” under 
HIPAA.  Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462, 82,542–43 (Dec. 28, 2000). 
 51 Daniels, 844 N.E.2d at 1186 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(1)(v) (West 2002)). 
 52 Id. at 1187 (citing Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 
Fed. Reg. at 82,667–68). 
 53 Id. (citing Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 82,482). 
 54 Id. at 1188.  The circularity problem may not be so easily solved.  Although federal legisla-
tors may not have intended to preempt state freedom of information laws, it is not clear that the 
authors of the state-level legislation intended to override privacy laws like HIPAA either.  Because 
the exemptions in this case mirror each other, there may be no way to ensure a principled statu-
tory interpretation.  See infra note 72.  
 55 No. 03-04-00743-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7655 (Tex. App. Aug. 30, 2006). 
 56 See id. at *39–40. 
 57 Id. at *1. 
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protected the information, requested an opinion on the matter from the 
Attorney General of the state.58  The Attorney General issued an opin-
ion stating that the information had to be disclosed pursuant to the 
Texas Public Information Act,59 as the Act fell within the exception to 
HIPAA requiring compliance with laws that compel disclosure.60  The 
Department disagreed and filed suit.61  The trial court declared the in-
formation confidential and thus not subject to disclosure under state 
law, avoiding the HIPAA preemption issue.62 
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the information re-
quested did not “relate to issues regarding health or condition in gen-
eral and certainly [did] not relate to the health or condition of an indi-
vidual” and therefore was not protected health information under 
HIPAA.63  However, the court still considered the issue assuming that 
the information was protected, as neither party contested that point in 
their briefs.64  The Abbott court first found that the Public Information 
Act fell within the exception stated in the HIPAA regulations.65  The 
court then reasoned that an exemption preventing disclosure of “confi-
dential” information within the Texas Public Information Act66 did not 
apply under usual state law considerations.  Further, drawing support 
from Ohio’s Daniels decision, the court pointed out that it would be 
circular for information to be “confidential” and thus exempted under 
state law merely because it might be considered protected health in-
formation under HIPAA, given the applicability of the HIPAA “re-
quired by law” exception.67  The court therefore concluded that “dis-
closure of the information requested [would] comply with all relevant 
requirements of the Public Information Act, HIPAA, and the [HIPAA 
regulations].”68 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 Id.  The Texas FOI law is peculiar in that it places the burden of enforcement on the Texas 
Attorney General rather than on the requester of the information.  The agency that receives the 
request must either release the records or request an opinion from the Attorney General’s office.  
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.301 (Vernon 2004).  If the agency does not request an opin-
ion, then the information “is presumed to be subject to required public disclosure and must be 
released unless there is a compelling reason to withhold the information.”  Id. § 552.302. 
 59 TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. §§ 552.001–.353. 
 60 Abbott, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7655, at *4–5. 
 61 Id. at *6. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at *14–15. 
 64 See id. at *18. 
 65 See id. at *32–34. 
 66 See TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 552.101 (Vernon 2004). 
 67 See Abbott, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7655, at *34–39. 
 68 Id. at *40. 
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D.  Analysis 
The courts in these cases struggled to interpret HIPAA and their 
own state FOI laws to strike the proper balance between medical pri-
vacy and the media’s right to gather information.  The Secretary of 
HHS anticipated these controversies and included the “required by 
law” exception to nondisclosure in the HIPAA regulations to address 
them.69  FOIA was intended to fall within this exception.70  The Secre-
tary further suggested that “generally a disclosure of protected health 
information [as defined by HIPAA], when requested under FOIA, 
would come within FOIA Exemption Six.”71  As Exemption Six is the 
statutory provision in FOIA that addresses privacy, this is a reasonable 
proposition.  The federal agency in this scheme would determine 
through a balancing test whether the requested information fell within 
Exemption Six, and all the normal FOIA analyses would apply.  The 
Secretary wisely avoided trying to resolve directly through statutory 
interpretation the circularity problem posed by the interaction of Ex-
emption Three with the “required by law” exception in HIPAA.72 
Because of the structural similarities between FOIA and state FOI 
laws, state agencies and courts would do well to apply the framework 
outlined by the Secretary, using the relevant Exemption Six analogue 
that deals with medical privacy or privacy more generally to resolve 
these controversies.  There are two main practical benefits to state en-
tities in adapting the HHS Secretary’s analysis of FOIA to their state 
FOI laws.  First, this approach simplifies the analysis by requiring 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 69 HHS noted that it received many comments urging the deletion of the “required by law” 
section of the HIPAA Privacy Rule so as to be more protective of privacy.  See Standards for Pri-
vacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,666 (Dec. 28, 2000).  
In response, HHS noted the many situations in which disclosures required by state or federal law 
might be warranted and stated that “given the variety of these laws, the varied contexts in which 
they arise, and their significance in ensuring that important public policies are achieved, we do 
not believe that Congress intended to preempt each such law unless HHS specifically recognized 
the law or purpose in the regulation.”  Id. at 82,667.  Although this conjecture as to congressional 
intentions may be accurate, the exception does poke many holes, of which FOIA is only one, in 
the privacy coverage that HIPAA was supposed to supply. 
 70 See id. at 82,482 (“Uses and disclosures required by FOIA come within § 164.512(a) of the 
privacy regulation that permits uses or disclosures required by law if the uses or disclosures meet 
the relevant requirements of the law.”).   
 71 Id.  It should be noted that the HHS Secretary’s interpretation of FOIA would receive no 
deference in court.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (“On complaint, the district 
court of the United States . . . shall determine the matter de novo . . . .”).   
 72 The interaction of these clauses may pose an insurmountable obstacle for both textualist 
and intentionalist theories of statutory interpretation.  For the former, the words themselves seem 
to present an inescapable circularity for the interpreter.  For the latter, the breadth of both FOIA’s 
Exemption Three and HIPAA’s “required by law” exception suggest that the legislature and 
agency meant to defer to all other statutes, or they would have only included enumerated exemp-
tions.  This does not resolve the question of which statute governs when the two conflict.  Thus, 
for practical purposes, focusing on Exemption Six and its analogues may be the soundest option.  
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only an interpretation of state law.  Second, there is a wealth of per-
suasive authority on which to draw to assist in the task.  At the federal 
level, Exemption Six has spawned a large body of case law interpret-
ing its provisions,73 and state courts could look to this case law for 
guidance in interpreting state FOI laws.  Other states’ case law could 
also serve as a source of persuasive authority.74 
The Texas court in Abbott was the only one to articulate and apply 
this strategy.  In Texas, the Exemption Six analogue comes in the form 
of a confidentiality exemption, and it clearly did not apply to the sta-
tistical information at issue in Abbott.  This example demonstrates that 
under the interpretive strategy suggested here, the result in a given 
case will be highly dependent on the statutory language of the state 
Exemption Six analogue and the nature of the information requested.75  
The state legislatures have chosen numerous paths to protecting medi-
cal information in their Exemption Six analogues, and courts should 
give force to these different approaches. 
The Ohio Supreme Court in Daniels correctly took notice of the 
“required by law” exception, focusing its analysis on the circularity 
problem and the definition of protected health information under 
HIPAA.  However, it failed to consider explicitly whether the lead risk 
assessment reports in question fell under its Exemption Six analogue, 
which takes a different line than Texas by exempting medical records, 
defined as “any document or combination of documents . . . that per-
tains to the medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition 
of a patient and that is generated and maintained in the process of 
medical treatment.”76  Because the lead risk assessment reports and 
notices were generated as a result of the provision of medical services, 
it is plausible that they would fall within this exemption. 
The Louisiana court in Hill made an error of a different sort.  It 
considered its Exemption Three analogue, which provides an excep-
tion “as otherwise provided by law” and incorporates by reference a 
confidentiality exemption similar to Texas’s, finding over a vigorous 
dissent that it applied.  But remarkably, it failed to discuss HIPAA’s 
“required by law” exception, applying HIPAA directly to the 911 calls 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 73 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982); Dep’t of the Air 
Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976); Sherman v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 244 F.3d 357, 361 (5th 
Cir. 2001); N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
 74 In fact, state courts already reference both federal courts, see, e.g., Campbell v. Town of 
Machias, 661 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Me. 1995), and other state courts, as the Abbott court did in con-
sidering Daniels. 
 75 For instance, states that use more subjective language similar to that of FOIA likely require 
application of a balancing test of medical privacy interests and the public interest in disclosure.  
Those states that make use of more objective language will require judgments merely classifying 
information instead.   
 76 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(3) (West 2002). 
 
 
1066 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:990 
and finding the information protected from disclosure on that basis. 
Because the court arrived at the same result under state law, the out-
come of this case would not have been altered by the correct reading of 
HIPAA.  However, with another Exemption Six analogue, the conclu-
sion may have been different. 
Journalists and other media entities should be pleased by the Secre-
tary of HHS’s commentary and its application to state law as sug-
gested in this Part.  In theory, the breadth of the Secretary’s “required 
by law” exception should lead state agencies and courts to proceed as 
they did prior to HIPAA, considering health information under state 
Exemption Six analogues.  The courts have not yet uniformly followed 
this approach, so it remains to be seen if HIPAA will in practice have 
a wider impact.77  If it does not, this limited effect may be a source of 
dismay for medical privacy advocates, as it leaves HIPAA toothless 
when interacting with state FOI laws.78  However, these backers of 
stronger medical privacy protections are not without recourse.  They 
could urge state legislatures to modify their FOI laws, as Utah has,79 
to exempt protected health information as defined by HIPAA.80  Al-
though the outcome under this method would clearly fail to live up to 
the ideal of a national standard of medical privacy, the completed bat-
tle to remove the “required by law” exception to the HIPAA regula-
tions has made that a fait accompli. 
E.  Conclusion 
Courts in Louisiana, Ohio, and Texas have been the first to con-
sider the conflict between HIPAA and state FOI laws.  The analysis 
suggested in this Part provides a framework for states to decide future 
cases that is consonant with the HIPAA regulations as articulated by 
the Secretary of HHS and faithful to the myriad statutory exemptions 
to the state FOI laws enacted by the state legislatures.  HIPAA may 
have the effect of raising awareness about medical privacy in many 
states, but its actual impact on newsgathering from public records will 
likely be minimal.  The media check on the government’s activity will 
continue, and the media watchdog will roam as free as it has in the 
past. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
77 One could also argue that HIPAA has at least raised awareness of medical privacy concerns, 
and this heightened awareness might affect judgments about whether information is disclosable. 
78 Some of those who commented on the proposed HIPAA regulations predicted this result. 
See supra note 69. 
79 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-107 (2004). 
80 They could also push for state court judges to expand interpretations of existing Exemption 
Six analogues, as the Louisiana court may have done in Hill.  However, the case for this judicial 
“updating” of state FOI laws in reaction to HIPAA is particularly weak, as the HIPAA regulations 
were only recently implemented, and legislatures have not had much time to react. 
